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NOTES
OSHA INSPECTIONS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: BALANCING PRIVATE RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC NEED.
I. Introduction
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),' is the
result of the Federal government's concern about safe working con-
ditions. The purpose of OSHA is to assure safe and healthful work-
ing conditions and to preserve our human resources.2 To effectuate
its goal of promoting industrial safety, OSHA authorizes the Secre-
tary of Labor to establish mandatory occupational safety and health
standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce. 3
It also authorizes the Secretary to enter and inspect any work place
during regular working hours and at other reasonable times4 to en-
sure compliance with the health and safety standards.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). For in depth discussions of OSHA and its legislative
history, see Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 3
Loy. Chi. L.J. 247 (1972); Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An
Overview, 4 Cum.-Sam. L. Rev. 525 (1974); Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970: Some Unresolved Issues and Potential Problems, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 304 (1972).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
3. Id. § 651(3). In addition, OSHA contains a general duty clause that requires both the
employer and employee to abide by the occupational and safety standards promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 654. This general duty clause is not a substitute for the stan-
dards, but rather allows the Secretary of Labor to insure the protection of employees who are
working under special circumstances for which no standard has yet been adopted.S. REP. No.
2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5186.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). Inspections, investigations and recordkeeping.
(a) Authority of Secretary to enter, inspect, and investigate places of employment;
Time and Manner.
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establish-
ment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is per-
formed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of
employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent, or employee.
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The inspection provision of OSHA has been attacked on the
ground that warrantless OSHA inspections violate the search and
seizure safeguards of the fourth amendment5 of the United States
Constitution. This Note will explore recent Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with administrative searches and seizures and con-
sider the effect of these decisions on fourth amendment challenges
to the OSHA inspection provisions.
II. Fourth Amendment Tests
In Camara v. Municipal Court,' appellant violated the San Fran-
cisco Housing Code7 because he refused to allow a warrantless
inspection of his premises, which he used partly as a personal resi-
dence in violation of the building's commercial occupancy permit.'
Appellant claimed that housing inspections, without a search war-
rant and not based on probable cause, violated the fourth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court held that a search warrant was required
in order for city housing inspectors to investigate violations of the
San Francisco Housing Code.'
In holding that the fourth amendment applied to administrative
inspections of residential premises, Camara overruled the holding of
Frank v. Maryland0 that search and seizure safeguards of the fourth
5. The fourth amendment provides that: 'The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7. Section 503 of the Housing Code provided:
"Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be
necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper cre-
dentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or
premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code."
8. 387 U.S. at 526-27.
9. Id. at 539.
10. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank, appellant violated the Baltimore City Code because
she refused to allow a Baltimore City health inspector, pursuant to a complaint, to search
her basement for evidence of rodent infestation. Id. at 361. Section 120 of Article 12 of the
Baltimore City Code provided:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time,
and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free
examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.
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amendment are only applicable to criminal investigations. Al-
though Camara required a search warrant, it recognized the public
interest in the maintenance of safe housing conditions and specifi-
cally held that the need to conduct safety code inspections through-
out a neighborhood satisfies the probable cause requirement for
obtaining a warrant under the fourth amendment."
In See v. City of Seattle,'" the companion case to Camara, appel-
lant sought reversal of a conviction for his refusal to allow a repre-
sentative of the Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect his
locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without proba-
ble cause that there was a violation of a municipal ordinance. The
inspection, similar to the neighborhood inspection in Camara, was
part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to ensure compliance
with Seattle's Fire Code.'3
The Court held that the businessman's right to fourth amend-
ment protection is indistinguishable from that of the private home-
owner, and extended the requirement of a search warrant to admin-
istrative inspections of non-public areas of commercial premises."
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated:
[T]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in
The court held that the search and seizure safeguards of the fourth amendment are only
applicable to criminal investigations. Id. at 365-67.
11. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance.
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or
abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve accept-
able results. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion
of the urban citizen's privacy.
387 U.S. at 537. "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. at 539.
12. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
13. Id. at 541. § 8.01.050 of the Seattle Fire Code provided:
Inspection of Building and Premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect
and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often
as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any
conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of
any ordinance concerning fire hazards.
Id.
14. "[Aidministrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises
which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force
within the framework of a warrant procedure." Id. at 545.
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jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws
can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official au-
thority evidenced by a warrant."
The reasonableness of the public policy that the particular statute
seeks to implement determines whether there is sufficient probable
cause to meet the requirements of Camara and See"8 for the issuance
of a search warrant. See requires the enforcement officer to obtain
a search warrant," but the need for effective enforcement of a par-
ticular statute meets the requirements of probable cause, for obtain-
ing such a warrant.
See did not decide whether refusal of entry is a necessary predi-
cate to the issuance of an administrative search warrant. Probable
cause standards may be even more flexible where a search warrant
is issued in advance of inspection."8 Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in
See, questioned the need for a search warrant at all:
It is interesting to note that in each of the cases here [Camara and See] the
authorities were making periodic area inspections when the refusals to allow
entry occured. Under the holding of the Court today, "probable cause" would
therefore be present in each case and a "paper warrant" would issue as a
matter of course. This but emphasizes the absurdity of the holding."
Several commentators share the sentiments expressed by Mr.
Justice Clark. One theory is that Camara and See are not radical
departures from Frank v. Maryland, although they require a search
warrant for administrative inspections.' Another commentator sug-
gests that since time is unimportant in the typical administrative
inspection case, the best way to protect privacy would be to give
15. 387 U.S. at 543.
16. "The agency's particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of
probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes
into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved."
Id. at 545.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 545 n. 6.
19. Id. at 553 n. 4.
20. The shift in the Court's doctrine from Frank to Camara and See is probably
only a slight one, both with respect to the increased burden on the officers and the
increased protection to the private party. The burden on the officers may be no greater,
because getting a search warrant is as easy as any other method of compelling compli-
ance and may even be easier. The protection to the private party is not significantly
enhanced, because warrants are likely to be issued on a wholesale basis, since the Court
specifically approves area inspection.
1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3.05, at 99 (1st. ed. Supp. 1970).
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notice to the private party of the officer's application for a warrant
and to allow a hearing before the magistrate on the question of
issuance of the warrant." A third view is that, in light of subsequent
administrative search decisions, Camara and See are a highwater
mark in the Supreme Court's application of the fourth amendment
to protect the individual's right to privacy.
III. The Colonnade-Biswell Exception to Camara-See
In Colonnade Catering Co. v. United States,23 agents of the Alco-
hol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service vis-
ited a catering establishment to inspect for a possible violation of
the federal excise tax law. The agents requested the president of the
catering establishment to open a locked liquor storeroom. When he
refused, the agents broke down the door to the storeroom and re-
moved bottles of liquor.
The Court upheld Section 7606 of the Internal Revenue Code
which grants agents of the Internal Revenue Service authority to
enter premises for inspection of articles subject to tax.24 Mr. Justice
Douglas expressed the opinion of the Court when he wrote: 5
We agree that Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection
under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand. The
general rule laid down in See v. City of Seattle, . . ., "that administrative
entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are
21. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
6 [hereinafter cited as LaFave, Administrative Searches]. In Professor LaFave's opinion,
enforcement was impossible as a practical matter under the traditional probable cause test
because most housing code violations occur within private premises and cannot be detected
from outside, most serious violations are noticeable only in the aggregate, and a relatively
small number of complaints, many anonymous, are received. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, the
typical routine inspection does not stigmatize an individual as a subject of police interest,
and does not require surprise. Id. at 18-19.
22. See Note, AFDC Caseworker's Visit to Home of Nonconsenting Welfare Recipient Not
Prohibited by Fourth Amendment, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 821, 827 (1971); Note, Administrative
Investigations of Welfare Recipients, 22 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581, 588 (1971).
23. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
24. (a) Entry during day.
The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime, any building or place where
any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be
necessary for the purposes of examining said articles or objects.
(b) Entry at night.
When such premises are open at night, the Secretary or his delegate may enter them
while so open, in the performance of his official duties.
25. 397 U.S. at 76.
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not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical
force within the framework of a warrant procedure"-is therefore not applica-
ble here.
The Court made it clear that if Congress had enacted penalties
other than a fine, the fourth amendment's requirement of
"reasonableness" would be satisfied.26 However, the only penalty
contained in the statute was a fine for failure to consent to inspec-
tion.27 In the absence of statutory authorization, the forcible war-
rantless seizure of the liquor violated the fourth amendment.
The question of whether forcible breaking and entering, if author-
ized by statute, violates the fourth amendment, was answered in
United States v. Biswell.5 A police officer and a Federal Treasury
agent visited respondent pawnshop owner, who had a federal license
to sell sporting weapons. The agent identified himself, inspected
respondent's books, and requested entry into a locked gun store-
room. Respondent asked whether the agent had a search warrant,
and the agent responded that he did not. The agent contended that
the Gun Control Act of 19689 authorized such inspections.3" When
respondent unlocked the storeroom, the Treasury agent found and
26. 397 U.S. at 77.
I.R.C. §7342. PENALTY FOR REFUSAL TO PERMIT ENTRY OR EXAMINATION.
Any owner of any building or place, or person having the agency or superintendence
of the same, who refuses to admit any officer or employee of the Treasury Department
acting under the authority of Section 7606 (relating to entry of premises for examina-
tion of taxable articles) or refuses to permit him to examine such article or articles,
shall, for every such refusal, forfeit $500.
27. Mr. Justice Douglas explained the distinctive characteristics of the liquor industry
that result in allowing warrantless administrative inspections but for the specific statute
involved:
We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspection.
As respects that industry, and its various branches including retailers, Congress has
broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures.
Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible
entries without a warrant. It resolved the issue, not by authorizing forcible, warrantless
entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the inspector.
397 U.S. at 77.
28. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1970).
30. 18 U.S.C. §923 (1970).
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of
storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector for
the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be
kept. . . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such importer, manu-
facturer, dealer, or collector at such premises.
NOTES
confiscated two rifles for which respondent did not possess a li-
cense.
3
'
The Court upheld the warrantless seizure because "in the context
of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is care-
fully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search
depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute. '3
Although the federal policy of close supervision of the gun industry
did not have as long a history as supervision of the liquor industry,
the Court concluded that inspecting the firearm industry is a valid
public policy.3 It held that requiring a search warrant to inspect gun
importers, dealers, manufacturers and collectors would frustrate the
efficacy of gun control. 34
Colonnade and Biswell create an exception to the general rule
prohibiting warrantless administrative inspections. When specifi-
cally authorized by a licensing statute, a warrantless search does not
violate the fourth amendment. 5 Even though the Court emphasized
that this exception applies only within the confines of a specific
statute, numerous commentators objected to the exception under
any circumstances. One critic charged that in Biswell the Court
rejected judicial precedent for judicial expediency because it placed
the public's need for warrantless inspections ahead of the individual
31. 406 U.S. at 312.
32. Id. at 315.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 316. Mr. Justice White stated: "[Ilf inspection is to be effective and serve as a
credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the
prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as
to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would
be negligible." Id.
35. See 1972 Wash. U. L. Q. 313, 327. Consent to the search is another exception. In
United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970),
the court stated that any manifestation of assent "no matter how casual" could reasonably
be accepted as proper consent. 429 F.2d at 1010. This approach is accepted even if the person
is not aware of his rights. United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969)
cert. denied 396 U.S. 1002 (1970); cf. United States v. Kendall Co., 324 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass.
1971); United States v. Morton Provision Co., 294 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1968) (consent
obtained without apprising the defendants that the investigation and any evidence discovered
could be used against them). Emergency is the third exception. "Since our holding empha-
sizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose
prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emer-
gency situations." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 539. Camara also cited: Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380
(1902); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
1977]
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citizen's right to privacy. 6 Other critics charged that Colonnade and
its extension in Biswell create the potential for harassment by over-
zealous officials37 and the possibility that treasury agents, under the
guise of searching for weapons, may work in collusion with local
police to search for narcotics, stolen property or other incriminating
evidence.18 In contrast, other writers noted that businessmen in ex-
tensively regulated industries impliedly consent to warrantless
inspections" and that a sufficiently precise statute serves the same
function as a search warrant. 0 One commentator even called for
extension of the Biswell reasoning to such regulatory agencies as the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).4' The Supreme Court de-
cision in See suggests application of both points of view in future
decisions. As the majority in See stated: "[any constitutional
challenge to such programs can only be resolved, as many have been
in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness."4
IV. Application of the Camara-See and Colonnade-Biswell
Rules
The Supreme Court's flexible43 construction of the fourth amend-
ment is illustrated by Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Al-
falfa Corp." An inspector of the Colorado Department of Health
entered the outdoor premises of respondent Western Alfalfa without
the knowledge or consent of its president. The purpose of the day-
light inspection, which was carried out without a warrant, was to
conduct an air pollution test. The inspector found that smoke emit-
36. 11 Duq. L. Rev. 253, 258 (1972).
37. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1023 (1973).
38. 22 Cath. L. Rev. 496, 502 (1973).
39. 43 Miss. L. J. 562, 567 (1972).
40. 49 Notre Dame Law. 879, 890 (1974). See note 58 infra.
41. Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1972, 25 Ad. L.Rev. 97, 110 (1973).
42. 387 U.S. at 546.
43. "The Fourth Amendment proscription against 'unreasonable .. .seizures,' applica-
ble to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, must not be read in a vacuum. A
seizure reasonable . ..as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a
different setting or with respect to another kind of material." Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496, 501 (1973).
44. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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ted from Western Alfalfa's chimneys violated air quality stan-
dards.45
The Court held that there was no violation of the fourth amend-
ment because the inspection was not an invasion of privacy compa-
rable to that in either Camara or See.4" Rather the inspection con-
cerned sights seen in the "open fields"47 which are not protected by
the fourth amendment.4 8
In Western Alfalfa, the company's expectation of privacy was not
violated because the inspector did not enter a private area." This
was not the case in United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co.,50
which involved an inspection pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act."
In Del Campo, FDA inspectors made a routine warrantless
inspection of defendants' premises pursuant to Section 374 of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." As a result of material seized dur-
ing the inspection, the defendants faced criminal prosecution for the
introduction and delivery of adulterated food53 into interstate com-
merce.
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
45. Id. at 862-63.
46. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized that: "[tihe field inspector
did not enter the plant or offices. He was not inspecting stacks, boilers, scrubbers, flues,
grates, or furnaces; nor was his inspection related to respondent's files or papers." Id. at 864-
65.
47. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
48. Id. "The invasion of privacy ... if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical."
416 U.S. at 865.
49. See note 47 supra. This was not the type of inspection involved in Camara, See,
Biswell, and Colonnade.
50. 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972).
51. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
52. 21 U.S.C. §374 provides:
(a) Right of agents to enter; scope of inspection; notice; promptness; exclusions.
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or employees duly designated
by the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice to the
owner, operator, or agent in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times,
any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics
are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for introduction into interstate com-
merce or after such introduction, or to enter any vehicle being used to transport or hold
such food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in interstate commerce; and (2) to inspect, at
reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such fac-
tory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all pertinent equipment, finished and
unfinished materials; containers, and labeling therein . . ..
53. 345 F. Supp. at 1373.
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relying on Biswell, held that consent to the inspection was not at
issue. 54 In so holding, Del Campo equated the pervasive regulation
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with the federal license in
Biswell. The court stated:
The fact that Congress has not required the Del Campo business to obtain
federal licenses to operate is wholly immaterial. Defendants' business of
manufacturing, processing, packing and distributing food products for intro-
duction into interstate commerce is as "pervasively regulated" by the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der, as if it were federally licensed. No rational or valid distinction can be
drawn for compliance inspections between a federally licensed business and
one so completely regulated by the Act under the commerce power. The
rationale of Biswell makes no such differentiation. The inspection, as con-
ducted of the defendants' facilities, was entirely proper under BiswellU'
In United States v. Business Builders, Inc.," the facts were simi-
lar to those in Del Campo." The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma relied on Biswell to hold that a
warrantless administrative search which is "carefully limited in
time, place and scope . ..does not depend on consent but on the
authority of a valid statute."58 The court in Business Builders
viewed the public interest in regulation of the food industry as more
important than regulation of the liquor and firearms industries."
The decision reinforces the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's place
in the Biswell-line of administrative search decisions."
54. Id. at 1376. "The thrust of the opinion is that there is no issue of consent to a
regulatory inspection conducted without a warrant when such a compliance inspection is
authorized by federal statute in a 'pervasively regulated business.' " Id.
55. Id. at 1377.
56. 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973). See also United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp.
1333 (D.D.C. 1973).
57. 354 F. Supp. at 142.
58. Id. at 143, quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). "In effect, the
statute takes the place of a valid search warrant." 354 F. Supp. at 143.
59. Id. at 143 n.1. The court stated:
Presumably, federal interest in liquor is pecuniary, due to thegreat amount of taxes
collected from that industry. Likewise, federal interests in firearms is the prevention
of violent crime. However, it would seem to this Court that the public health and
welfare under any system of values would be more important than revenue and sup-
pression of criminal activity.
Id.
60. See United States v. Acri Wholesale Grocery Co., 409 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Iowa
1976)(photographic evidence held to be within ambit of reasonable warrantless administra-
tive search).
NOTES
The Camara-See and Colonnade-Biswell rules provide the frame-
work for determining the relationship"' between the fourth amend-
ment and administrative searches. Some commentators read
Colonnade and Biswell as applicable only to the liquor and firearms
fields;" however, lower courts occasionally apply these same rules
to other regulated areas. 3
V. OSHA Inspections and the Fourth Amendment
A. The Isolation of Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.
In Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.,64 an OSHA inspector at-
tempted an inspection of the premises of Buckeye Industries with-
out a warrant.65 Buckeye Industries did not have any citations for
violations of OSHA, nor were there any employee complaints of
unsafe working conditions." Nevertheless, the Secretary sought and
received a court order compelling Buckeye Industries to submit to
an inspection. 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia held that the Colonnade and Biswell decisions govern
OSHA inspections." In allowing the inspection the court focused on
the specific OSHA warrantless inspection provisions." "It is clear
that the Act confers no right upon any representative of the Secre-
tary to make inspections or searches unconnected with the objects
of the legislation. The right to inspect is confined to structures,
61. See Administrative Searches and the Implied Consent Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth
Amendment, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 91 (1976).
62. Currie, OSHA, 1976 ABF Res.J. 1107, 1159 (1976).
63. United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 875 (1974) (licensed pharmacies); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (mine safety).
64. 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
65. 29 U.S.C. §657(a) (1970).
66. The Secretary or his authorized representative may conduct an investigation at the
instigation of any employee or employee representative who believes that a violation of a
safety or health standard exists and that it threatens an employee's physical safety or pres-
ents an imminent danger. Id. §657(f)(1).
67. 374 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
68. Chief Judge Lawrence relied on the decisions in Biswell, Terraciano, and
Youghiogheny. See Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.: The Constitutionality of a OSHA
Warrantless Search, 1975 Duke L.J. 406, 413 (1975), where the author properly criticized the
Buckeye court's reliance on these cases involving regulated industries. Buckeye Industries
manufactured clothing which is not a regulated industry. 374 F. Supp. at 1351.
69. Id. at 1356.
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machines, equipment and material as well as conditions having
relevance to those purposes."7' In addition, the Buckeye court em-
phasized that a requirement of a search warrant to conduct OSHA
inspections would frustrate the purpose of surprise inspections.7'
This is clearly an erroneous view of Camara and See,7" and subse-
quent OSHA inspection decisions repudiated it.
B. OSHA Inspections Require a Search Warrant
In Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc.," OSHA inspectors at-
tempted to inspect the non-public area of a shoe store to determine
if its owner was complying with OSHA regulations. Lacking proba-
ble cause, the Secretary did not seek a search warrant but rather
sought a court order compelling the store to submit to inspection.74
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
denied the Secretary's petition on the ground that a warrantless
OSHA inspection violates the fourth amendment."5 The Gibson's
Products court noted that OSHA inspections encompass all forms
of industry"0 and therefore warrantless inspections would permit a
70. Id. at 1354. The Buckeye court ignored the Western Alfalfa decision, where Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas implied that if the inspector entered private areas he would have violated the
fourth amendment. See note 47 supra. Moreover, the Buckeye court took an incorrectly
narrow view of OSHA's scope. OSHA does not just apply to structures and machinery. As
one Senator observed, OSHA applies to ". . . every business affecting commerce in the entire
United States, ranging anywhere from a big steel company to a shoeshine shop." 116 Cong.
Rec. 36, 509 (1970) (remarks of Senator Dominick).
71. The court stated:
Viewed in the frame of the regulatory powers of the federal government and the
compelling need for unannounced inspections, there is no unreasonable entry under
the Fourth Amendment. The necessity of showing probable cause as a requisite would
serve to destroy the object of the legislation. In effect, it would require an employee to
report a violation in order for any investigation to be made as a predicate to corrective
action.
374 F. Supp. at 1354.
72. The correct interpretation is that inspections may be made without probable cause.
See Currie, OSHA, 1976 ABF Res. J. at 1159.
73. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
74. Id. at 155-56.
75. Id. at 156. "[biroad and indiscriminate inroads on fourth amendment safeguards,
wrought in the name of administrative expedience and weighty governmental interest, are to
be viewed with no [great] favor .... " Id. at 161.
76. "It [OSHAI thus embraces indiscriminately steel mills, automobile plants, fishing
boats, farms and private schools, commercial art studios, accounting offices, and barber
shops-indeed, the whole spectrum of unrelated and disparate activities which compose
private enterprise in the United States." Id.
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roving commission of inspectors to conduct inspections with unfet-
tered discretion." The court held that OSHA inspections are au-
thorized ". . . only when made by search warrant issued by a
United States Magistrate or other judicial officer of the third branch
under probable cause standards apropriate to administrative
searches-that is, in a constitutional manner.""
Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc.7" is in accord with Gibson's
Products. In Dunlop, two OSHA inspectors failed to gain access for
a routine inspection of Hertzler Enterprises. The inspectors re-
turned with a search warrant80 but were again denied entry. There-
upon, the Secretary sought a court order to compel Hertzler Enter-
prises to submit to an inspection."
The court first enumerated the requirements that an administra-
tive inspection must meet to come within the Colonnade and
Biswell rules.82 It then emphasized that in the absence of pervasive
federal regulation and because of OSHA's broad application,
Camara and See govern OSHA inspections84 and require a search
warrant based on probable cause. 5
77. Id. at 162. The Gibson's Products court cited Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973) (warrantless auto search by United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service inspector violates the fourth amendment). Furthermore, the Gibson's Products court
indicated that the store was not licensed by the federal government nor did the industry have
a history of close regulation. 407 F. Supp. at 162.
78. Id.
79. 418 F. Supp. 627 (D. N.M. 1976).
80. The inspectors did not have proof of probable cause when they applied for the search
warrant. Id. at 628-29.
81. Id.
82. First, the enterprise sought to be inspected must be engaged in a pervasively
regulated business. The presence of this factor insures that warrantless inspection will
pose only a minimal threat to justifiable expectations of privacy. Second, warrantless
inspection must be a crucial part of a regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent
federal interest. And third, the inspection must be conducted in accord with a statu-
torily authorized procedure, itself carefully limited as to time, place, and scope.
Id. at 631-32.
83. Hertzler Enterprises manufactured ammunition and paper boxes. Id.
84. "[lIt is presumed that Congress intended to empower the Administration to conduct
nonconsensual inspections only pursuant to the authority of a warrant issued upon satisfac-
tion of standards of probable cause which have been articulated in the area of administrative
searches." Id. at 634.
85. The Gibsons Products court declined to declare the OSHA inspection provision un-
constitutional. To achieve this result, the court did not interpret the phrase "enter without
delay" found in 29 U.S.C. §657(a) to be the equivalent for "without a warrant." 407 F. Supp.
at 162. The only suggestion that the statute contemplates warrantless searches is in the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
In Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery,9 the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho, unlike the courts in Gibson's Products and
Hertzler Enterprises, construed the OSHA inspection provision lit-
erally. The president of Barlow's 7 denied entry to an OSHA inspec-
tor because he did not have a search warrant." The Secretary then
sought and received a court order compelling entry, inspection and
investigation. The president again refused the inspection and re-
quested that a three-judge court be convened to enjoin enforcement
of the Act on the ground that it violated the fourth amendment.
The three-judge court, in its literal reading of OSHA, concluded
it was not the intention of Congress that a warrant be obtained for
an OSHA inspection because there was no language in the statute
requiring a warrant." Rejecting the decision in Buckeye Industries,
the Barlow's Inc. court held, nevertheless, that such warrantless
OSHA inspections are controlled by Camara and See, and require
a search warrant." The court stated: "We . . .hold that the inspec-
minority views of a rejected version of the bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
55 (1970) (views of Representatives Scherle, Ashbrook, Eshleman, Collins, Landgrebe, and
Ruth). The only discussion of the "without delay" phrase shows that it was intended to
prevent an employer from preventing inspections by avoiding the inspector's presentation of
credentials. 116 Cong. Rec. 38,709 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Galifianakas, quoting
Congressman Steiger). The author of the "without delay" phrase reminded the House that
inspections would have to be conducted in accordance with "applicable constitutional protec-
tions." Id. (remarks of Congressman Steiger). Yet during the hearings on the 1974 Review of
OSHA, Senator Curtis submitted an amendment to the inspection provision. "(2) No inspec-
tion or investigation shall be undertaken ...unless the Secretary has probable cause to
believe that there is . . .a violation... "See Occupational Safety and Health Act Review,
1974, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 61 (1974) (statement of Senator Curtis).
86. 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1977).
87. Barlow's Corporation engaged in the installation of electrical and plumbing fixtures,
heating and air conditioning units. Id. at 438.
88. Id. Nor did the inspector have probable cause to believe that a violation existed. Id.
at 438-39.
89. Id. at 439.
90. [Wle decline the invitation to judicially redraft an enactment of Congress.
Unlike the Gibsons Products court, we cannot accept the proposition that the lan-
guage of the OSHA inspection provisions envision the requirement that a warrant be
obtained before any inspection is undertaken. Certainly, Congress was able, had it
wished to do so, to employ language declaring that a warrant must first be obtained,
.. .and other necessary regulations. Congress did not do so and we refuse to accept
that duty. Id. at 441 n. 4.
91. Id. at 440. The court relied on Camara, See, and Western Alfalfa. "[Elach was
involved with statutory and regulatory schemes aimed at promoting and protecting public
health and safety. The warrantless inspections authorized under OSHA likewise seek to
promote public health and safety .... " Id. at 441.
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tion provisions of OSHA which have attempted to authorize war-
rantless inspections of those business establishments covered by the
Act, are unconstitutional as being violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment." 2
Barlow's Inc., is an unfortunate digression" from a decisional
trend that properly balances the safeguards of the fourth amend-
ment with the need to ensure the health and safety of the worker.
Marshall v. Shellcast Corp.," follows the trend but adds a new
element to the requirement of probable cause for an OSHA inspec-
tion. Two foundry companies denied access to OSHA inspectors
who attempted to conduct an inspection pursuant to the National
Emphasis Program (NEP).95 The issue before the court was whether
a report indicating that the accident rate in the iron and steel
foundry industry was approximately three times that of employers
generally was sufficient for probable cause in the absence of any
particular violation or hazard on the defendant companies' prem-
ises."
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Louisiana acknowledged that the use of an incident measure is ap-
propriate for "singling out target industries."97 However, to meet the
probable cause requirement for inspection of a specific corporation,
OSHA must first seek any available information about the accident
rate at that specific corporation. 8 Therefore, the court held "that
92. Id. at 442. However, the Acting Solicitor General applied for a stay of the Barlow's
Inc. decision. Upon order of Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Barlow's Inc. decision was "stayed insofar as it purports to restrain the conduct of
applicant outside the District of Idaho, pending receipt of a response from respondent and
further order of the Circuit Justice or of the Court." 45 U.S.L.W. 3517 (Feb.1, 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 76-1143, 45 U.S.L.W. 3587 (Mar. 1, 1977).
93. The Barlow's Inc. court confuses judicial redraftmanship with proper statutory con-
struction. See note 85 supra.
94. 46 U.S.L.W. 2079 (Aug. 23, 1977).
95. Id. NEP involves compliance inspections of particular industries, one of which is the
iron and steel foundry industry. NEP is similar to the OSHA Target Industry Program (TIP).
R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 66 (1976), provides an excellent statisti-
cal analysis of TIP's effect on the reduction of work-related injuries.
96. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2079-80. One company also claimed that the OSHA inspection provi-
sion is unconstitutional. The court disagreed. "The failure of Congress to explicitly provide
a procedure by which warrants can be obtained and probable cause established does not
render the section itself unconstitutional. Constitutionality can, in essence, be saved by a
requirement that such a showing and procedure be followed." Id. at 2079.
97. Id. at 2080.
98. There is dictum to the effect that a NEP report would meet the requirement of
19771
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where individualized information is present, OSHA or other simi-
larly situated organizations cannot close their eyes to the individual
situation, relying upon some national accumulated group of statis-
tics.""
VI. Conclusion
Administrative inspections of industries that are not subject to
pervasive federal regulation must be based on the Camara-See rules
that require probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Although the degree of probable cause varies with the public policy
that the particular inspection statute seeks to implement, a war-
rantless administrative inspection clearly violates the fourth
amendment. The Colonnade-Biswell rules pertain to administrative
inspections of industries that are subject to pervasive regulation in
the form of a federal license or a highly specific federal statute.
Businessmen who engage in such regulated industries impliedly
consent to inspection and therefore a warrantless inspection does
not violate the fourth amendment.
The impact of OSHA on the reduction of work-related injuries is
not yet clear;'"" however, the constitutionality of the inspection pro-
vision seems settled in the lower courts. Since OSHA inspections are
applicable to all areas of industry, it is necessary that they be con-
ducted with some restraint. It is therefore reasonable to require a
search warrant based on the Camara-See rules of probable cause.
Yet protection of the health and safety of the worker must not be
sacrificed.'"'
As regulation has expanded and intensified, the administrative quest for
facts and more facts has gained momentum and has seemingly become an
probable cause if no specific information were available. "If the court were faced with a
situation that certain industry measures, such as used in the NEP selection mechanism, were
the only data available, the inference certainly could be drawn that those individual plants
within the industry bore some investigation." Id.
99. Id.
100. One author states that "it would not be surprising to find that OSHA has had a
negligible impact on the overall injury rate in industry." See R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH AcT 67 (1967). Yet another concludes: "OSHA is an interesting combina-
tion of bold legislative initiative and faulty drafting .... In the main the procedures of the
Act are daring and progressive." See Currie, OSHA, 1976 ABF REs.J. 1107, 1160 (1976).
101. The National Occupational Health Survey released a survey that indicates one out
of four American workers is exposed on the job to some substance thought to be capable of
causing death or disease. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
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irresistible force. This force has collided with what at first were apparently
immovable constitutional principles concerning . . . searches and seizures
... . The constitutional principles remained firm for a time but gradually
weakened and crumbled. The force proved irresistible. Remnants of the con-
stitutional principles are left standing, but only to an extent clearly consis-
tent with permitting administrative agencies freely to secure factual materi-
als needed to carry out the programs they administer.'"
Glenn J. Fuerth
102. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §3.01, at 53 (3d Ed. 1972).

